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Abstract 
This article explores the Pinochet case, widely heralded as a landmark, as a 
case of ‘intermestic’ human rights that raises difficult normative and 
empirical questions concerning cosmopolitan justice.  The article is a 
contribution to the sociology of human rights from the perspective of 
methodological cosmopolitanism, developing conceptual tools and methods 
to study intermestic human rights in terms of the inter-relations between 
cosmopolitanising state institutions and cultural norms.  The argument is 
made that in order to understand issues of cosmopolitan justice, sociologists 
must give more consideration to political culture. 
 
Arrested in October 1998 with a warrant from a Spanish magistrate 
demanding his extradition for crimes against humanity committed whilst he 
was President of Chile following a military coup, Pinochet was put under house 
arrest in the UK until March 2000 when he was finally declared by the Foreign 
Secretary Jack Straw to be medically unfit for trial and flown home to Chile.  
The Pinochet case was a landmark for the human rights movement, widely 
celebrated as a turning point in the extension of international human rights 
standards (1).   
 
The study of human rights has been dominated by legal scholarship, but in this 
article the Pinochet case is studied sociologically, from the perspective of 
cosmopolitanism (see Beck 2006a).  The sociological study of human rights 
requires special attention to issues of justice (see Turner 2006).  Although 
methodological and normative cosmopolitanism are distinct, the former 
necessarily includes the latter insofar as ‘really existing’ issues of cosmopolitan 
justice are one of the most significant sites for the cosmopolitanising of 
institutions and, potentially at least, for ‘reflexive cosmopolitanism’, or an 
enhanced orientation towards ‘world-openness’ (Beck 2006a: 6; Delanty 
2006).  The Pinochet case offers the opportunity to explore difficult questions 
for cosmopolitanism, especially concerning the ‘who’ of justice where borders 
are no longer taken-for-granted.   
 
Justice that is more than merely procedural requires both legitimate 
institutional procedures - the modern, rational procedures of law and 
bureaucracy - and also a bounded, concrete community that recognises those 
procedures as legitimate.  Justice has to be seen to be done – not only to those 
who demand it (justice can not simply be relative to demands), but to a 
community for whom the desire for justice in a particular case is both 
comprehensible and morally significant.  Framing justice as ‘national’ in the 
international states system tied procedures of justice and political community 
together in such a way that questions of ‘who’ were not raised (Fraser 2006).  
But once this frame is disrupted, the development of cosmopolitan norms 
requires both the production of new formal-procedural institutions and the 
imagining of new political communities.  How are political communities of 
justice formed beyond the national state, and how can sociologists 
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conceptualise and study their formation and re-formation in relation to 
cosmopolitanising state institutions?   
 
As sociologists, we cannot restrict our study of human rights to legal 
definitions if we are to understand emergent possibilities for cosmopolitan 
justice.  In fact,  in strictly legal terms, the Pinochet case did not concern 
human rights violations, which  are not criminal matters; human rights law 
takes the form of civil and public law and offers only civil remedies.  For 
sociological study, however, legal definitions are just part of understanding 
human rights.  Political and popular uses of the term ‘human rights’ tend not 
to distinguish between different branches of law.  For example, both Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch frequently described the Pinochet case 
in general terms as concerning human rights violations and in the media the 
case was invariably represented as concerning human rights.  Human rights 
have meanings and effects beyond the legal domain and these are as crucial for 
cosmopolitan justice as changes in the law.   
 
The Pinochet case certainly involved extremely complex legal reasoning.  The 
initial finding by a Divisional Court that Pinochet was entitled to diplomatic 
immunity as a former head of state was appealed in the House of Lords where 
there were then three judgements by the Law Lords concerning the case, 
though only one legal decision.  In the first judgement (Pinochet 1) the 
majority of the Lords found that Pinochet should be extradited to face criminal 
charges in Spain because international customary law, which would otherwise 
have prevented prosecution of a head of state for acts whilst committed in 
office, could not be understood to sanction crimes against humanity.  This 
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judgement was then set aside for reasons of alleged bias on the part of one of 
the judges (Pinochet 2), an unprecedented decision that could have triggered a 
constitutional crisis on the eve of reform of the House of Lords (Woodhouse 
2003).  Finally, the Lords decided that Pinochet should be extradited 
(Pinochet 3), on much narrower technical grounds than Pinochet 1.  However, 
the Pinochet case also involved political maneuvering: huge public 
involvement (Straw received over 70,000 letters about it), vigorous lobbying of 
the government by NGOs, passionate political protest by Chileans in London 
and in Chile, more or less secret diplomatic negotiations with officials acting 
on behalf of other states, and a sharp re-drawing of Left-Right political lines 
that had, arguably, softened in the first decade after Communism.  It was also 
a huge media event, with the Law Lords’ decisions broadcast live on TV for the 
first time, the story of Lord Hoffman’s association with Amnesty that led to 
Pinochet 2 breaking on Newsnight, and media coverage of the story reaching 
saturation point, at the beginning and at peak moments throughout the course 
of events.  According to Geoffrey Robertson the media even played a crucial 
role in Pinochet’s arrest: it was prompted by an article published in The 
Guardian on October 15th 1998,  ‘A Murderer Among Us’, written by Hugh 
O’Shaughnessy, Chairman of the Latin American Bureau (Robertson 2002: 
396).     
 
The study of human rights law operates with a strict division between 
international law (eg Steiner and Alston 2000), and domestic law (eg Fenwick 
2002).  From a sociological point of view, however, this conventional legal 
paradigm is misleading and it is important to understand how .human rights 
are becoming ‘intermestic’.  Though universal in form since their inception in 
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natural law, human rights have only come to be applied to non-citizens within 
and across national borders relatively recently.  This does not mean, however, 
that borders become irrelevant in human rights cases.  Human rights are 
becoming intermestic rather than transnational: human rights do not just 
cross borders, they contest, disrupt and sometimes re-configure them.  
‘Intermestic’ marks the complexity of such social processes, which disrupt and 
re-make the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of states, and which are not yet definitively 
mapped or adequately theorised.  In this respect the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights was a turning point in the globalisation of 
human rights, the beginning of a system that systematically monitors states’ 
compliance in ensuring individuals’ human rights, regardless of nationality.   
The end of the Cold War was another turning point, enabling virtual consensus 
on the importance of supporting civil and political human rights for 
individuals and groups within states and promoting the development of legal 
and political means to realise them (Forsythe 2000).  Political use of the 
language of human rights is increasingly important in the rhetoric both of state 
elites and of NGOs (which themselves cross borders, often having ambiguous 
status in relation to the international/domestic distinction) to justify action at 
home and abroad.  Even in law, increasing legalisation of human rights 
complicates the international/domestic division (3).  For example, 
international customary law may be drawn on in national courts; and domestic 
law is created through reference to international agreements and conventions, 
so that lawyers and judges may refer to the intentions of international actors, 
or to cases and law in other nations, as well as to domestic cases.   
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Institutions of procedural justice nevertheless all depend on the machineries of 
states, which sign and ratify treaties and conventions, appoint officials to serve 
in international institutions, enable NGOs to operate within their territories 
and so on.  It is states that enable and finance legal and bureaucratic decision-
making fora at the national or international level, and, in the case of 
international organisations, they continue to be the only systematic means by 
which citizens are represented, at least nominally.  The continuing importance 
of states in terms of membership and representation of citizens as well as the 
historic dominance of the ‘national’ frame of justice means that imagining 
communities of justice beyond the nation must emerge from within the 
international system of national states.  The ‘international community’, a term 
that is used ambiguously to refer to the ‘community of states’ or sometimes to 
include also intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and even ordinary 
citizens, must be deepened within national states if there is to be cosmopolitan 
justice.  De-territorialised and re-territorialised political communities have to 
emerge through the mobilisation of identities engaged with and supportive of 
the extension of frames of justice to include non-national ‘Others’ as valid 
subjects of justice – and not say, charity, or benevolence of some kind – within 
public space formed and maintained by states.   
 
From (inter)national to cosmopolitan public policy? 
In order to study the sociological implications of the Pinochet case for 
cosmopolitan justice, I first developed ideal-types of public policy to explore 
the novelty of the case along different dimensions.  The ideal-types of public 
policy developed here encompass both formal-procedural institutions of law-
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making and the administration of law, and also the cultural norms which 
legitimate those institutions (Considine 2005).   
 
As an ideal-type, (inter)national public policy has been dominant at least from 
decolonisation until the end of the Cold War.  It consists of three main 
elements along the overlapping dimensions of the national and the 
international: 
 
1. state sovereignty – a state is to be free from interference by other 
states in its policy-making and law enforcement to enable justice as 
self-determination of the people;   
2. for self-determination to be effective, states must have sole 
jurisdiction over what takes place within their own national 
territory, where jurisdiction concerns the ‘power of the state to affect 
people, property and circumstances’ (Shaw 2003: 574); 
3. public policy is made for the people who make up the nation and, 
ultimately, they must consent to it – if not through elections, then by 
not rising up against the government or the state.  The frame was 
undoubtedly complicated after World War Two, as liberal 
internationalism challenged the ‘internal’ conception of justice on 
which classic sovereignty had been based, especially in the case of 
war crimes.  However, the balance of powers until the end of the 
Cold War meant that international law effectively maintained classic 
sovereignty, being overwhelmingly concerned with keeping the 
peace between states in order to ensure the conditions for justice as 
a matter of internal politics and law (Held 2002). 
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 Intermestic human rights cases thoroughly disrupt (inter)national public 
policy.  In the Pinochet case, in relation to the first point above, state 
sovereignty was found to be illegitimate where it conflicts with international 
human rights norms.  The principle that state sovereignty means heads of state 
are free to act in the state’s interest and are, therefore, immune from 
prosecution was considered by judges in the Pinochet case and found to be 
illegal, confirming the conflicting principle that only state action within human 
rights norms is legitimate and that individuals who act against those norms are 
liable for prosecution.   
 
Secondly, jurisdiction was problematised in the Pinochet case, as both Chilean 
and UK state action was circumscribed by international law.  This was most 
evident in Chile, where the amnesty which Pinochet had been granted by a 
democratically elected Chilean government was not considered legitimate 
grounds in the UK for ignoring evidence that he had committed gross 
violations of human rights and could therefore be tried for crimes against 
humanity.  Chilean legislation was held not to be relevant in the UK court.  The 
case of the UK is more complicated, because the different Law Lords’ decisions 
in the case have somewhat different implications, as we shall see.  However, 
insofar as, in both cases, the UK court allowed that Pinochet should be 
extradited for trial in Spain under customary international law, it appeared to 
accept that courts have universal jurisdiction over some crimes, which should 
be prosecuted wherever and by whomever they have been committed.  The UK 
therefore had a duty to extradite or to try Pinochet, regardless of 
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considerations of ‘national interest’ or the embarrassment of the British 
government.   
 
Thirdly, the normal frame for justice was problematised insofar as the 
Pinochet case raises the question of who is the public for whom the law is 
enacted.  Pinochet was arrested in London on a warrant issued by a Spanish 
prosecutor acting on behalf of those tortured and murdered in Chile on 
Pinochet’s orders, regardless of their nationality (4).  The Pinochet case 
therefore raises in a very dramatic way the question, what are the bounds of 
the community for whom justice must be seen to be done in this case?  And 
more generally, how are communities of justice to be conceived of and formed 
in relation to intermestic human rights, which break the bounds of assumed 
national political communities? 
 
 (Inter)national public policy has been widely challenged by many aspects of 
border-crossing social action associated with globalisation, which both 
produce new kinds of policy problems, and also networks, organizations and 
institutions of global governance that are growing up to deal with them.  
Developed out of the work of cosmopolitan sociologists and political theorists 
(5), the following ideal-type of cosmopolitan public policy provides a useful 
comparison with that of (inter)national public policy: 
 
1. state sovereignty is increasingly being shared in international 
institutions of co-operative global governance, and this is necessary to 
meet the policy problems increasingly thrown up by globalisation (Held 
1995; Slaughter 2005; Beck 2006); 
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2. the legitimacy of policy actors depends upon the extent to which they 
conform to norms of international human rights and humanitarian law 
developed through international state co-operation (Crawford and 
Marks 1998; Beetham 2000; Held 2002); 
3. the legitimacy of policy depends on the appropriateness of the scale at 
which it is made - local, regional, national, transnational, supranational 
and so on - which in turn depends on the scale of the relevant policy 
problem and accountability to different communities according to an 
‘all affected’ rule (Held 1995; Gould 2004; Fraser 2005).   
 
The Pinochet case conforms very well to this model of cosmopolitan public 
policy in relation to the first two points.  In relation to the first point, the 
international law under which Pinochet was prosecuted involved sharing state 
sovereignty.  The Law Lords found that Pinochet could be extradited to Spain 
in accordance with customary international law – which is defined as 
established state practice, in accordance with international law, and followed 
‘from a sense of legal obligation’ (Steiner and Alston 2000: 70).  In addition, 
the UK law under which it was ultimately decided that he should be extradited 
to Spain was first developed as the Convention Against Torture in the UN, and 
incorporated into UK law in the Criminal Justice Act of 1998.  In relation to 
the second point, the way in which Pinochet repressed opposition to his 
military rule was found not to be acceptable because of developing customary 
international law against genocide and torture.  Pinochet’s position as a former 
head of state did not legitimate his actions because it conflicted with this body 
of developing law. 
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Concerning the third point, the formation of a relevant political community of 
justice, however, the implications of the Pinochet case are not so clear.  As it is 
currently developing, global governance ‘borrows’ state coercion in order to 
police and enforce international norms (see Slaughter 2005).  Global 
governance does not exist above state institutions, but through them.  The 
claim that ‘all affected’ are to be included as equals in a political community 
aimed at realizing justice has been much more thoroughly debated in 
normative political theory than by sociologists and empirical political theorists 
(see, for example, Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon 1999), and how this might 
work in practice has been little considered.  How are political communities of 
justice actually formed in practice in cases of intermestic human rights like 
the Pinochet case?   
 
Towards cosmopolitan public policy? 
As well as extending the institutional innovations of the cosmopolitanising 
state, did the Pinochet case also involve contestation of the taken-for-granted 
national political community of (inter)national public policy?  What cultural 
resources were available in the case for the construction of alternative political 
communities accountable at different scales for justice to ‘all affected’?  To 
explore these questions, I compared constructions of intermestic human rights 
produced by four principal actors in the case.  At issue here were cultural 
norms produced for the public, rather than technical reasoning produced in 
legal and bureaucratic institutions.     
 
International non-governmental organizations (INGOs).   
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INGOs put pressure on states through international institutions and from 
within the domestic arena to fulfil international human rights obligations at 
home (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al 1999; Soysal 1994).  In the Pinochet 
case, Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) were 
especially prominent, granted leave to intervene in the appeal, they made 
written submissions to the court and were represented by counsel.  They were 
also active, along with other INGOs, in lobbying government, and in 
publicizing their view of the case, producing regular reports, press releases, 
and public statements. 
 
 
The judiciary  
Whilst the sociology of human rights requires a wider perspective than that of 
legal, or even socio-legal studies, legal reasoning is obviously very important to 
public constructions of intermestic human rights.  Here my analysis concerns 
the Law Lords’ highly publicised judgements in Regina v. Bow Street 
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte.  
 
Politicians  
Influential politicians of the cosmopolitanising state are clearly also important 
to intermestic human rights cases, especially where, as in the Pinochet case, 
they involve direct relations with other states.  In fact, ultimately the decision 
to extradite Pinochet lay with the Foreign Secretary in the UK government.  
However, since Jack Straw’s decision was officially ‘quasi-judicial’, there was a 
formal ban on speeches and comments on the case amongst members of the 
government.  Those few comments that were made on the case were the topic 
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of enormous amounts of media conjecture and speculation.  Widely discussed 
were those of Peter Mandelson, Trade Secretary, shortly after his arrest, that it 
would be ‘gut-wrenching’ to see such a ‘brutal dictator’ like Pinochet escape 
justice – immediately declared ‘emotional and unhelpful’ by ‘cabinet sources’ 
but widely suspected to have been made strategically; and Tony Blair’s 
mention of Tory support for Pinochet in a speech to the Labour Party 
Conference in 1999 (see  news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/460009.stm).  
Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the Conservative Party Conference in 2000, 
which railed against her own party for abandoning him, produced a storm of 
media commentary (see 
www.guardian.co.uk/tory99/Story/0,,202256,00.html).   
 
The media 
It is very difficult to know what role the media may play directly in putting 
pressure on politicians and judges – though the media strategies of INGOs 
suggest they certainly think it is important.  From the point of view of the 
creation of political community, however, the media is clearly vital - not least 
because popular media itself constructs and consolidates the national framing 
of politics (Billig 1995; Anderson 1983).  Media coverage of the case was here 
represented by coverage of the case from Pinochet’s arrest to his departure in a 
selection of broadsheet and tabloid newspapers: The Guardian, The Observer, 
The Mirror, The Mirror on Sunday were selected as progressive, and The Daily 
Telegraph, The Sunday Telegraph, The Sun and The News of the World as 
conservative papers.   
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My analysis of the material produced by these actors throughout the case was 
designed to get as close as possible to the meanings of intermestic human 
rights constructed by the actors involved whilst at the same time enabling 
comparison with the ideal-types of (inter)national and cosmopolitan public 
policy.  I first coded the material into generally relevant categories (eg 
‘leadership’, ‘authority’, ‘law’) and then recoded it in relation to the ideal-types 
of (inter)national and cosmopolitan public policy outlined above.  The 
resulting models of ‘global citizenship’, ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ and 
‘(inter)nationalism’ are simplified popular  descriptions which are at the same 
time evaluations of the world, delineating the roles of states and of peoples, 
adopting positive or negative orientations towards cosmopolitanisation as 
exemplified by the Pinochet case.  My concern here is not with how effective 
any of these models were in actually creating real, felt, political communities 
with commitments to justice for ‘all affected’, but rather with how the 
meanings of intermestic human rights were produced and organized in the 
Pinochet case.   
 
 
Global citizenship  
The main public policy actors who consistently articulated and at the same 
time positioned themselves as advocates within a model of global citizenship, 
unsurprisingly, were human rights INGOs.  Publicity surrounding the majority 
reasoning of the Law Lords in Pinochet 1, including the Lords’ televised 
summing up of the decision, also contributed to the construction of global 
citizenship, imagining a political community for justice which orients itself 
towards belonging with others in the world as human beings beyond the 
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sharing of a political space created around a national state.  The other actors 
who constructed this vision - though not as forcefully or exclusively as INGOs 
– were the progressive newspapers, especially the broadsheets.  Global 
citizenship was the dominant model of the liberal press, especially represented 
in editorials and in articles, letters and appeals on the part of INGO activists 
and sympathizers (6). 
 
Global citizenship had much in common with the ideal-type of cosmopolitan 
public policy.  Indeed, and controversially, it articulated an understanding of 
international law as already existing in fact as cosmopolitan law, positing as 
fact the following set of conditions: 
 
1. the subjects of international law are individuals and groups, not 
institutions – state sovereignty is irrelevant; 
2. the legitimacy of policy actors depends upon the extent to which 
they are willing to uphold international law – law (as fact) is 
equivalent to justice (as norm);  
3. the community for whom justice is to be done is citizens of the globe 
who are constituted as such by international law. 
 
Advocates of global citizenship acted as if the state were a neutral political and 
legal apparatus – a carrier for global values of international law.  The strategy 
of INGOs here was one of what we can call ‘performative declaration’.  The 
rhetoric produced by AI and others sought to represent their ‘clients’ (those 
who had been tortured and the relatives of the disappeared) in legal terms, as 
if cosmopolitan law defending  individual entitlements regardless of national 
  15
boundaries already existed (see Held 2002; Hirsh 2003).  For example, in a 
report immediately following the Divisional Court’s decision (before the case 
went to appeal), that Pinochet did have diplomatic immunity from 
prosecution, AI stated that ‘The UK cannot refuse to implement the rule of 
international law’ in extraditing Pinochet to Spain for trial (‘The inescapable 
obligation of the international community to bring to justice those responsible 
for crimes against humanity committed during the military government in 
Chile’ 22/10/98) (my italics)).   
 
Global citizenship gained a good deal of credibility with the Law Lords’ 
decision in Pinochet 1.  The judgement articulated a model of global citizenship 
insofar as it held that state sovereignty does not trump the legal entitlement of 
individuals, regardless of their nationality or residence, thus constituting all 
individuals as global citizens in international law.  However, the Law Lords’ 
interpretation of customary international law came as a surprise to 
international lawyers, even if they hoped for this outcome (Bianchi 1999; 
Sands 2005).  Pinochet 1 was decided by a majority of just three to two and 
justifications for majority and dissenting opinions turned to a large extent on 
different interpretations of international law, with dissenting Lords taking the 
traditional view that it regulates relations between sovereign states so that 
former Heads of State are immune from prosecution, even in the case of 
crimes against humanity.  The Lords staged a clash between fundamental 
principles of international law itself and Pinochet 1 was a landmark decision 
because it might easily have gone the other way.   
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In the model of global citizenship, however, the political community of global 
citizens is constituted as ‘always already’ existing as a consequence of 
international law – though it is, in fact, contentious and, at best, in 
development.  Advocacy for global citizenship on the part of INGOs and 
progressive journalists is presumably intended to put pressure on judges and 
politicians and in this respect it successfully challenges the hegemonic 
(inter)national frame of justice: Pinochet should be extradited to Spain or tried 
in the UK, because international law is clear.  On the other hand, however, the 
model of global citizens as ‘always already’ constituted by the ‘fact’ of 
international law offers no resources for debate over the scales at which 
legitimate political communities beyond the national state are to be formed, 
and for whom.  Framing the relevant political community as ‘all humanity’, the 
discourse of global citizenship provides neither resources for thinking through 
the problem of scale, nor of how ‘all affected’ in this case might be delimited.  
The difference between justice that is merely procedural and justice that is 
recognized as significant and legitimate by a concrete group of people is elided 
in a construction of international law as positivist that is neither historically 
realistic, nor normatively justified.   Justice, and especially ‘cosmopolitan 
justice’, is never merely procedural – who is brought to trial, by whom and for 
what does not solely depend on legal procedures but on political will and state 
capacities.  (In fact, Pinochet was welcomed into Britain by the UK 
government and only arrested because of the determination of a Spanish 
prosecutor, though he should, according to the Law Lords’ decision, have been 
arrested automatically and tried by the UK authorities.)  The model of global 
citizenship, in its celebration of law as always already cosmopolitan, closes off 
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any questions about who is the political community for whom such trials are 
carried out, and who decides who should be tried, when and where.  
 
Cosmopolitan nationalism 
The model of cosmopolitan nationalism is a hybrid, articulating something like 
a cross between (inter)national and cosmopolitan public policy.  This is a 
model that posits cosmopolitan public policy as progressive, as the best 
possible future for global society.  However, at the same time, and 
paradoxically, it constructs ‘we’ the people as rooted strongly in nationalist 
sentiment and passionate loyalty to a civic nation.  In relation to the Pinochet 
case, cosmopolitan nationalism was most evident in the coverage of the 
progressive tabloid press.  Examples throughout the case include: ‘You can 
stick your justice; arrogant Pinochet insults Britain’ (The Daily Mirror 
12/12/98); ‘British justice can still shine like a beacon across the world’, the 
opening line of an editorial headlined ‘No escape from justice for tyrant’ (The 
Daily Mirror 26/11/98); and, when Straw announced Pinochet was unfit for 
trial, from a letter under the headline ‘Day of shame’, ‘It is a sad day for Britain 
and for justice’ (The Daily Mirror 3/3/00).  Patriotism was more muted in the 
progressive broadsheets, overt only in letters.  For example, ‘[Pinochet’s 
arrest] gives me hope that Britain can regain its reputation as a leading force 
for democracy and human rights’ (The Guardian 19/10/98); ‘Britain can take 
the lead in providing a clear global signal to those who commit genocide and 
human rights abuses’ (The Guardian 24/10/98); and, when Pinochet was 
about to be released, ‘For the first time in my life… I am ashamed of being 
British’, The Observer 12/3/00.  (7) 
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Cosmopolitan nationalism has been very popular among politicians in the UK 
government in the last few years.  Tony Blair’s government has tended to 
present itself as advancing cosmopolitan public policy, but it can only do so 
whilst appealing to an electorate that is, as a matter of fact, organized on a 
national basis (see **** forthcoming).  In the Pinochet case, cosmopolitan 
nationalism is hinted at in Tony Blair’s speech to the Labour Party in 1999, 
which created an equivalence between fox hunting, Pinochet and hereditary 
peers in order to portray Labour as liberating ‘British strength and confidence’ 
from the ‘forces of conservatism’ for a progressive politics to take on the ‘forces 
of change driving the future’ that ‘Don’t stop at national boundaries.  Don’t 
respect tradition…. [W]ait for no-one and no nation… [A]re universal.’ 
 
Cosmopolitan nationalism articulates the following points in comparison with 
(inter)national public policy: 
 
1. the subjects of international law are individuals and groups who are 
members of nations; 
2. the legitimacy of policy actors depends upon the extent to which they 
are willing to uphold international law – law is equivalent to justice;  
3. the community for whom justice is to be done is made up of individuals 
who identify as members of nations represented by national states 
 
The basic motif of this model is that ‘we’ - who are unquestionably members of 
a national political community first and foremost - take pride in our state 
insofar as it upholds universal human rights that are applicable across the 
world.  Again facts and norms are intertwined in this discourse.  As a matter of 
  19
fact, cosmopolitan nationalism presupposes that we are in a kind of 
transitional phase, between the international states system and a more 
cosmopolitan version of law as breaking through state sovereignty; especially 
where gross violations of human rights have occurred or in order to prevent 
them, states are no longer self-contained discrete units of jurisdiction.  
However, descriptive and evaluative analysis overlap insofar as politics is seen 
as misplaced in cases of gross violations of human rights, as a brake on justice 
rather than as a legitimate domain of public policy decision-making.  Gross 
violations of human rights both will be and should be a matter for 
international law rather than for politics, whether national or international.   
 
Cosmopolitan nationalism was confirmed in the legal reasoning of Pinochet 3 
– albeit in such complicated ways as to be virtually unintelligible to non-
lawyers.  Pinochet 3 was far less dramatic and novel than Pinochet 1, though 
equally highly publicised.  The Law Lords granted extradition on narrow 
technical grounds and reduced the number of alleged crimes on the basis of 
‘double criminality’ (a principle not discussed in the previous hearing)  in the 
Extradition Act, allowing only those charges of crimes to stand which were 
committed after the date at which the Torture Convention was incorporated 
into English law.  In this respect the decision was at odds with judges’ 
interpretation in Pinochet 1 that some acts, including torture and hostage-
taking, are crimes in international law, wherever and whenever they are 
committed.  The reasoning of Pinochet 3 constructed, then, a much more 
equivocal endorsement of international customary law, and the enactment of 
‘quasi-universal’ rather than universal jurisdiction, according to which 
obligations are only accepted by a state on the basis of international treaties 
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insofar as they have become part of domestic law by ratification or 
incorporation (Shaw 2003: 598).  The Lords at the same time confirmed the 
status of international law as piercing (Chilean) sovereignty in not allowing 
Pinochet immunity from prosecution for alleged international crimes, whilst at 
the same time minimising its impact on traditional understandings of 
international law by confirming (UK) sovereignty in allowing only obligations 
of international law that had been incorporated as domestic law to count as 
law.    
 
Pinochet 3 is very unclear, in terms of legal precedent and also in terms of 
popular understanding, with both those for and those against putting Pinochet 
on trial claiming victory.  It does, however, make sense from within the 
paradoxical model of cosmopolitan nationalism.    
 
The basic orientation of cosmopolitan nationalism is imperialist in that it is 
assumed that only some nations are able to uphold international law, and they 
must take responsibility for those that are not capable.  Interestingly the 
inferiority of other nations was most overt in relation to other European 
powers rather than Chile.  It was especially evident when Belgium, France and 
Switzerland made a bid, with AI, to use the International Court of Justice in 
the Hague to stop Straw releasing Pinochet to return to Chile on grounds of ill-
health.  For example, beginning a satirical article with ‘Appearance: Short, 
squat, dull country, filled with people eating too many chips and not being able 
to make up their minds which language to speak’, The Guardian went on to list 
recent Belgian violations of human rights including ‘torture and unlawful 
killing’ in Somalia, ‘slave trafficking’, deaths in police custody and ‘one of the 
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biggest child porn stories in Europe, mixed in with police corruption and 
bungling’ suggesting that such a history ruled Belgium out as a state that could 
be trusted to administer international justice (The Guardian 27/1/2000).  This 
is, of course, deeply ironic given the British disinclination, across progressives 
and conservatives, to reflect on our own imperialist history (Gilroy 2004).   
 
In cosmopolitan nationalism the hegemonic ‘who’ of the political community 
for whom justice is necessary is challenged and expanded beyond the nation 
insofar as non-nationals are the legitimate objects – though not subjects - of 
justice.  In this respect, cosmopolitan nationalism challenges hegemonic 
(inter)national public policy.  In other respects, however, cosmopolitan 
nationalism confirms the nation as the political community most relevant to 
justice-claims insofar as it is assumed that procedures of justice are in safe 
hands only so long as ‘we nationals’ are administering it.  ‘All affected’ are not 
necessarily members of a political community made up of active subjects once 
claims for justice are extended beyond the nation.  They are rather the passive 
recipients of justice that is endorsed by a (superior) national political 
community capable of responsibly deciding whether there is a case for justice 
to be answered, who is entitled to it, and how it is to be administered. 
 
(Inter)nationalism 
The model of (inter)national public policy, whilst challenged by the Pinochet 
case in some ways, was reconfirmed in others.  This model was exemplified in 
Thatcher’s dramatic speech to the Conservative Party, which re-iterated 
themes widely covered by the conservative media throughout the case.  It was 
also represented, in a much more muted fashion, in the progressive 
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broadsheets.  For example, from the beginning writers at The Guardian were 
critical of the British authorities for allowing Pinochet to enter the country 
(while he was not given leave to enter France), a criticism that assumes proper 
diplomatic relations between states are more important than the universal 
justice of international norms (8). 
 
 The emotional and moral economy of the Pinochet case is completely different 
in the model of (inter)nationalism: ‘our’ obligations as a nation are to foster 
‘national interests’ rather than to consolidate and uphold universal principles 
of international human rights regardless of state sovereignty, especially wise 
management of tax-payers’ money and good commercial relationships with 
other countries, as well as showing loyalty and respect to our friends and care 
for our reputation as a state in the international society of states.  In 
(inter)nationalism, only national states have jurisdiction over acts committed 
within their national territories, and international law is nothing more than 
real politick masquerading as law, which potentially leads to greater injustice 
for everyone.  In terms of political community, while each national state is a 
discrete individual entity, for (inter)nationalism, the lives of ‘our’ national 
fellows are worth far more to ‘us’ than others.  This was made explicit in one of 
Thatcher’s arguments, rehearsed from the beginning of the case in the 
conservative press, that Pinochet was entitled to respect and honour because 
he had been of invaluable help during the Falklands war, saving many British 
lives as a result.   
 
However, what is most interesting from the point of view of our discussion 
here is that it is only from within the terms of the model of (inter)nationalism 
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that a strongly anti-imperialist perspective emerged with respect to the 
Pinochet case.  In the conservative press, anti-imperialism was based on 
unconditional principles of national self-determination and tended to slip into 
relativism.  Pinochet’s brutality – and the conservative press did not dispute 
that Pinochet was responsible for torture and the disappearance of about 3 - 
4,000 people - was justified by circumstances; above all, by the need to combat 
communism.   There are many examples of this approach in The Daily Mail, 
including an article by Norman Tebbit, former Cabinet Minister in Thatcher’s 
government: ‘The Chileans believe that they have to forget the methods 
Pinochet used to deliver them from communism and give them prosperity and 
democracy’ in ‘Make them hit the road Jack’ 25/10/1998.  A letter from 
Thatcher to The Times on October 21st 1998 which stated that there were ‘acts 
of violence’ on both sides was widely quoted; and the argument that Pinochet 
freed Chile also featured in her speech to the Conservative Party conference: 
‘There are implications for Chile, where the small minority of communists who 
once nearly wrecked the country under Allende will now be encouraged to 
overturn the prosperous, democratic order that Pinochet and his successors 
built.’ (9)  From this point of view, because national concerns are (naturally) 
dominant for national political communities and states, political judgements 
that may seem wrong to one people must be understood as appropriate in 
another national context. 
 
In the progressive papers, anti-imperialist criticisms were much more 
conditional.  In its progressive form (inter)nationalism in the Pinochet case 
constructed state sovereignty as viable only insofar as it enabled democracy 
and respect for human rights.  There was, therefore, consideration of how 
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Chile had consolidated itself as a democratic state as a result of the actions of 
international elites in the Pinochet case to the point where Pinochet might 
even stand trial in Chile should he be returned.  Several reports from Santiago 
that appeared in The Guardian towards the end of the case, for example, 
suggest that changes had been produced by Pinochet’s arrest to make Chile 
freer and more democratic (eg ‘People find the confidence to face the truth but 
fear the general’s last laugh’ 16/10/99, and ‘Chilean calls grow for Pinochet 
trial’ 6/3/00). 
The implicit principle here is that foreign policy - the decisions of one state 
(UK), in voluntary co-operation with others, should contribute to establishing 
democracy and the rule of law in another (Chile) – but as a matter of ethical 
foreign policy, in which international law might figure strategically, but does 
not direct state conduct (10).   
 
Clearly the (inter)nationalist model does not contest (inter)nationalist public 
policy at all, but rather supports it.  As such, although it does enable questions 
of imperialism to be raised, it provides no resources for thinking about 
dilemmas of cosmopolitan justice and how political communities for justice 
might be formed beyond national states.   
 
Conclusion
In this article I have considered the Pinochet case as a much-celebrated 
example of the realisation of international human rights norms and as 
potentially therefore offering the resources for a transition to cosmopolitan 
justice.  Developing ideal-types of (inter)national and cosmopolitan public 
policy I have argued that institutionally the Pinochet case was undoubtedly 
  25
innovative.  However, its value is much less clear if we consider that justice 
also requires community.   
 
One methodological implication of this study of the Pinochet case is that 
cosmopolitan sociologists and empirical political theorists must take political 
culture much more seriously.   Cosmopolitan theorists have neglected both the 
theorisation and the detailed empirical examination of political culture and 
this neglect makes it impossible to understand political community as shared 
meanings and constructed identity in relation to institutions of authoritative 
governance.  It is not sufficient to point out, as cosmopolitan theorists tend to, 
that imagining political community as represented by the national state is 
comparatively recent historically, and that it is not immutable (Held and 
McGrew 2002).  Nor is it enough to consider influences in global culture on 
reforming national communities as a result of the growth of global 
communications and transnational communities, without reference to 
institutional changes (see Fraser forthcoming).  As Benhabib has argued, 
fostering ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ involves the iteration of democratic norms 
(Benhabib 2004).  Sociologists of cosmopolitanism can not be satisfied, 
however, with assuming that the cosmopolitanisation of institutions in broadly 
multicultural or even post-national societies is matched in a general way by the 
cosmopolitanisation of identities, especially in relation to law and politics.  
What is needed are concrete, empirical studies of how iterations of cultural 
norms in relation to institutional changes lead to dis-identifications and the 
formation of new identities, or to the modification or the reactive consolidation 
of established identities, and what relation they bear to a cosmopolitan ideal of 
justice.  As we have seen in the Pinochet case, intermestic human rights now 
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require re-imagining communities of justice, not only for normative or abstract 
theoretical reasons, but as a necessity that is thrown up by the development of 
the institutions of the cosmopolitanising state.   
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Notes 
1. See Sands 2005 on Pinochet as a landmark, legally but also because of the 
way it made ‘international law’ a topic of public discussion to an 
unprecedented degree.  Cosmopolitan sociologists have taken the Pinochet 
case as an indication that we may be on the threshold of a new era of 
cosmopolitan law (Habermas 1999; see also Beck 2006: 223). 
 
2. This situation is now becoming more complex – especially when it is a 
matter of prosecuting crimes against humanity that took place in peace time 
rather than in armed conflict (for example, in cases brought to US courts under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act private individuals may be brought to trial for gross 
violations of human rights; see Meckled Garcia and Cali 2006: 16).   
 
3. The legalisation of human rights involves the way in which, since the end of 
the Cold War, international agreements are becoming more detailed, precise 
and binding; and law that draws on and invokes human rights is increasingly 
interpreted and applied in national and international courts (Abbott, Keohane 
et al. 2001).   
 
4. Whilst the first warrant for Pinochet’s arrest referred only to Spanish 
victims, this was found to be ‘bad in law’ and a second was issued that did not 
refer to victims according to nationality.   
 
5. Key texts in the development of cosmopolitan sociology (as distinct from 
philosophy) include Archibugi et al. 1998; Archibugi 2004; Beck 2002, 2003, 
2006a, 2006b; Benhabib 2004; Delanty 2006; Held 1995, 2002;  Habermas 
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1999, 2001; Fraser 2005, 2006, and forthcoming; Turner 2002; Woodiwiss 
2002. 
 
6. Examples from the very beginning of the case, which set the tone for 
subsequent coverage, include: H. O’Shaughnessy, ‘A murderer among us’ The 
Guardian 15/10/98; J. Hooper ‘The game is up for Pinochet’ The Observer 
18/10/98, and an (untitled) editorial in the same edition; B. Wazir’s interview 
with Carlos Reyes (leader of Chile Democratico) in The Guardian 19/10/98; all 
letters to The Guardian 19/10/98; The Mirror’s editorial ‘Evil Pinochet must 
now face justice’ 19/10/98; and letters in The Mirror under the headline ‘The 
right and human rights’ 23/10/98.  The progressive papers represented this 
model strongly throughout the case.  Examples from the end of the case 
include: The Mirror ‘Betrayed; torture victims round on Jack Straw after he 
allows Chilean tyrant Pinochet to fly home’, and ‘MP Anne slams Pinochet 
victory’ both 3/3/00 when Straw announced Pinochet was unfit for trial; also 
The Observer M. Lattimer (AI Director of Communications) ‘Only tough 
judicial action can halt the torturer’s roll call of abuse’ 24/10/99; and an 
interview with Claudio Cordone, the leader of AI’s Pinochet campaign in The 
Guardian 4/3/00.    
 
7. Cosmopolitan nationalism was not possible in this case for the conservative 
press because of the polarisation of Left and Right over Pinochet.  In other 
cases, however, it is possible that the distribution of these models could be 
quite different across conservative and progressive media.   
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8. For example, H. Young ‘A wicked man’s arrest squeezes old principles out of 
New Labour’ 22/10/98; and a letter under the headline ‘It’s safe to come out 
Adolf’ which ended ‘Whereas the right of the British legal system to put a 
former head of state on trial may be in question, that of Her Majesty’s 
Government to refuse admission to undesirable aliens is not’ 30/10/98.  The 
Guardian also ran occasional reports and commentary that fit more easily into 
the model of (inter)nationalism than that of global citizenship: for example, a 
report from legal and political correspondents, ‘Straw Hints at Deal with Chile 
over Pinochet’ 23/10/98, and a letter protesting ‘foreign interference in the 
affairs of Chile’ and ending with ‘We are not a Spanish colony and will never be 
a British one.  A basic human right is free determination.  Let us exercise this 
right’ 5/11/98. 
 
9.  Anti-colonialism was a recurrent theme of conservative tabloid opinion 
pieces and editorials.  For example, from The Daily Mail, P. Johnson ‘Left-wing 
Judges and a Shabby Omission’ 9/12/98 on the alleged bias of Lord Hoffman; 
‘Jack’s all right… what about Chile?’ 10/12/98 and ‘Tories and Chileans Pile 
the Pressure on Straw in Extradition Row’ 27/11/98; from The Sun, an 
editorial ‘Why Has Britain Arrested a Friend in Need?’ 19/10/98, and a report 
from G. Pascoe-Watson, ‘Pinochet in Tears as He Faces Trial’ 10/12/98.  The 
Daily Telegraph generally gave what appeared to be a more comprehensive and 
balanced account of the case, but it did orient stories towards unrest in Chile 
as a result of Pinochet’s arrest, with headlines like ‘Tension Turns to Violence 
on the Streets of Santiago’ 22/10/98 and ‘Pinochet’s Return Puts Democracy 
Under Strain’ 5/3/00.   
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10. The first Labour government under Tony Blair was officially associated 
with ‘ethical foreign policy’, an idea that Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary put 
forward soon after they were elected. 
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